

Question: for Sovs, McN...

Schles/Rumsfeld/Brown (Brzezinski) NuWep guidance seems a return to my McNamara guidance of 1961-62--i.e., before McNamara's shift to emphasis on Assured Destruction of 1964 and later. Latter shift was motivated in part by Air Force exploitation of the implications for larger force requirements: larger numbers of MM and the B-70, rather than by Soviet hardening (expected?), SU Polaris subs, or large numbers of ICBM's. (Was it also influenced by the partial test ban, and hopes/expectations that this would be followed by a CBT: or was this not expected? Or by SALT?) (Or simply--after Cuba II--that both sides were deterred by existing levels, and would continue to be so?

Did McNamara apprehend the difference it made that Khrushchev had been replaced by Brezhnev?

Looking ahead: was it accidental that the number of Soviet hardened ICBM sites (1400) outran the ability of the MIRVd Minuteman missiles (2100 warheads) to eliminate in a first strike?

Or that these numbers, with larger missiles, did permit the Soviets to threaten the entire MM force, once MIRVd and with greater accuracy achieved (before the US could introduce MX)

Was this aimed at: a) beating US to the punch (a preemptive capability against land-based missiles);

b) matching US capability against sub-based missiles and ~~some~~ some land-based missiles.

c) anticipating US ability to threaten whole SU land-based capability (MX)--earlier capability inadvertent. (Did Sovs underestimate or neglect effect of stimulating US buildup? Did they underrate their influence, as VC did in attacking US bases in 1964-65? Did they simply consider US buildup was unstoppable by them (was this wrong)? How do they rate the potential of US antinuclear movement now?)

d) Was this an unplanned corollary of improving accuracy and MIRVing? Did they notice? Did they care?

Might Andropov take a new look at these recent policies? Might he have opposed them in past?

A big difference from 1961--and one which seems totally at odds with the '61 guidance and the reflections of it in 1974-82, is the emphasis on targetting Soviet C3I and Soviet leadership (and before that, the emphasis on Soviet recovery capability)..

It is the latter emphasis on Soviet command that enlarged the NSTL from 25,000 to 40,000.

Likewise, emphasis on targetting hardened ICBMs (and ASW?); this corresponds to Kaufmann's emphasis in 1961, not mine (argument then for B-70; now, for B-1, and perhaps cruise missiles, aimed at reload capability, which takes from 12 hours to 2-5 days (1980 Su exercise

New CW

USG discussion of, and prep for,
a "disrupting" attack ~~(Adversary)~~
as a reasonable option —

points to possibility of its use, either
in preemption or retaliation, by any country
having nuclear weapons. Khr.

Valuable new weapons (especially but
not exclusively), in addition to C³, are also
lighting-rods for new attack (and non-attack)
in certain circumstances — namely, those
circumstances in which it seems possible or likely
that they will probably be used.

This "crisis instability" has always
been a major flaw in the theory of "deterrence-
by-possession-of-nuclear-weapons,"
insofar as this possession is coupled
with FU/FS threats & readiness (as per US!)
(see McN on French "deterrence": 1962
SS-G's: SU, Berlin.)

In absence of a very good (or any)
FS cap. by US, weapons in Europe are
pure fighting-rods (though they also
threaten SU... so, all the more!')

(evidently — if the US got rid of everything
but Trident II...

(Reagan is saying to NATO: Wait till
we also have MX & Trident II)... & CD...